Sometimes the best plan isn't a plan

The big story this news cycle is the White House's rejection of the Democrats' "plan" for a phased withdrawal from Iraq. To be clear, this is not really a plan, but the gist of comments from the Sunday morning news shows.

But even that may be too much of a plan for where we stand today.

Say, anybody out there have a plan for solving our Iraq problem? Anybody think that if we just do X, everything will simply fall into order and we'll march out to smiles and waves from our new Iraqi allies?

I don't have a plan and I don't believe in any magic X. My advice to Democrats is simple: Don't trust any simple solutions. This is why it never bothered me that Democrats didn't offer any detailed plans for fixing Iraq in either 2004 or 2006: Solving complex international problems by centralized political planning is seldom a good idea.

Original White House intentions aside, it is safe to say that we are in the mess we face today because America's political leadership didn't listen to the voices of wise counsel within its professional ranks. Jay Garner was replaced by the disastrous Paul Bremer. Dissent among senior officers was squelched to such an extent that otherwise loyal generals found themselves in revolt against the stubbornly wrongheaded edicts of Donald Rumsfeld. Democratic critiques from Capitol Hill were not heard at all.

Solving Iraq will take more than grand political plans and arbitrary deadlines. The best thing the Democrats can do right now is to make sure that the White House opens its ears to the voices it has long ignored. Bring in the mavericks and heretics from Spookworld, the State Department, the armed forces and both parties. Empower the smart people who have been ignored for the past four years. Try diplomacy and reach out to other nations as well. Remember that we have an executive branch for a reason.

A general direction change is fine, but I hope the Democratic plan for Iraq goes something like this: Rescue America's smart professionals from the political wilderness to which they have been consigned, and use what clout you have to make sure they get a chance to help us steer our way out of this tricky passage.

Comments

[p.lukasiak]

at this point, the "plan" has to be how to limit further damage to the US and Iraq.

But regardless of the "plan" and how good it might be, there remains the problem of its execution. We still have that cretin in the White House running things -- and all indications (renominating Bolton, trying to rush through the warrantless wiretaps and horrible "energy" bill in the lame duck congress) are that the elections haven't provided with with the necessary "come to Jesus" moment that he needs to change.

So, regardless of the plan, it going to be screwed up by Bush, and things will only get worse.

[Tim]

"Bring in the mavericks and heretics from Spookworld, the State Department, the armed forces and both parties."

Like?

Gen. Tony Zinni
The Lost Year in Iraq
Peter W. Galbraith
Peter W. Galbraith
Zaid Al-Ali

[Tim]

Speak of the devil:

The Skinny

While talk of withdrawal from Iraq is all the rage, some very well-respected military analysts – including former CENTCOM commander Gen. Anthony Zinni, and retired Army Major Gen. John Batiste, are calling an immediate withdrawal not such a swell idea, The New York Times reports on its front page.

More mavericks:

Deadline for Troop Withdrawal Ruled Out (Jan. 30, 2005)

Pentagon officials have disclosed few details about the new training plan, which is being developed by the two top commanders in the region, Gens. John P. Abizaid and George W. Casey Jr. It was reviewed this month by retired Gen. Gary E. Luck at the request of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

Several officials familiar with it said the plan will involve not only training more Iraqi forces but also assigning U.S. officers to work directly with Iraqi soldiers and police officers in the field to develop stronger leadership. The plan also will seek to fill senior positions at the Iraqi ministries of defense and interior and strengthen connections between the ministries and Iraqi forces in the field, officials said.

By the spring, U.S. commanders hope to have Iraqi forces begin to take the lead in combat operations in some areas. Such a shift will need to be coordinated closely with Iraqi authorities to avoid the kind of premature handovers that U.S. officials say in retrospect occurred in cities such as Fallujah and Samarra, which in recent months have required U.S. combat offensives to reimpose control. The idea appears in keeping with the concept voiced publicly last week by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in an interview with the Financial Times.

FORD STATEMENT ON IRAQI ELECTION (Jan. 31, 2005)

First, if the on-the-ground U.S. military leadership is allowed to begin a comprehensive training of Iraqi security and military forces, American troops can begin coming home faster. Now the Pentagon should shift from fighting the insurgencies to a comprehensive training of Iraqi forces as recommended by retired General Gary Luck, who recently returned from a Pentagon ordered open-ended review of our operations in Iraq.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (Apr. 12, 2005)

Committee on Armed Services: Committee met in closed session to receive a briefing regarding assessment of Iraqi Security Forces from General Gary E. Luck, USA (Ret.), Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno, USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, The Joint Staff.

[Daniel]

Not all mavericks and heretics will agree -- but consensus isn't the point. Informed decision-making is.

Of course, speaking to Paul's point, a broken decision-making process, no matter how deliberative, is not likely to improve (See Cass Sunstein's excellent new book Infotopia). But improving outcomes without considering better information sources is practically impossible, so we need to start by hearing those who've been silenced. One hopes this is the true focus of the bipartisan Iraq study group.

It's also worth considering the possibility that certain "failed" policies were not themselves hopeless -- but that they failed because they were aligned with dishonest or incompetent intentions. For example: How might our attempts at empowering the Iraqi security forces be viewed if the United States were privately demonstrating its willingness to dismantle some of the dozen or more "enduring bases" it has constructed in the country? How would such a maneuver change the relationships between the parties in Iraq?

My point is not that it would -- rather, it's that I'm in no position to judge, and if it fell to average bloggers to solve this problem, we could be assured of a messy-at-best outcome. I want the smart people working on this, and I want leadership that gives them meaningful problems to solve.

[Tim]

I was under the impression that the coalition had already turned over dozens of bases to the Iraqi military and police. That construction at those bases improved security and infrastructure for the Iraqi units.

Am I wrong?

My understanding was coalition forces were being consolidated at four "enduring bases" in Iraq: Balad, al-Asad, Tallil and al-Qayyarah.

Am I wrong?

This was being done in combination with embedding US advisors/small units with Iraqi units.

Am I wrong?

How is this an example of "'failed' policies" aligned with dishonest or incompetent intentions?

I can certainly understand that we're not in a position to judge if we're not in a position to know the underlying facts - "ground truth" - in Iraq.

Would you consider any of the people named in my comment above "the smart people?"

[Tim]

BTW: just call me Walter ...

;)

[Daniel]

I think I'm just about always ready to concede that I'm more likely to be wrong on this subject than you are, Tim. To carry on our Big Lebowski theme here, when it comes to Iraq, I'm pretty much the Dude wandering around in L.A. I don't have an answer, I don't even know the best information sources, and I'm not likely to invest the time right now that it would take for me to be confident in my opinions.

Which is, of course, our social contract. People who don't have specific knowledge hire and fire (allegedly) the government based on performance. But if the public tries to micromanage Iraq policy, it will not end well. Which is why, right now, I'd settle for signals that we're listening to the right people.

Ironically, you're one of the people that I'll be listening to for those signals in the coming months. And so is Paul.

[hue]

Check out what Robert Baer has to say. I'm not sure there is a plan to fix Iraq at this point.

The "What do kidnappings have to say about Iraq" video.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3036697/

[Tim]

Dan,

re: social contract

I think that's what I found so educational these past two years learning about journalism and rhetoric.

Especially about Lippman and Dewey.

My wife asks our girls if they "have their ears on" when she wants them to pay attention.

I think we also want to know that our elected reps have their "ears on," especially when it comes to Iraq.

[Tim]

The Long War (mp3)